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From the Legal Literature
If the Fetus Is a Person—Is It Relevant? An
Argument on the Rights of Pregnant
Women
Francesca Laguardia*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1971, Judith Jarvis Thomson published “In Defense of Abortion”
in Philosophy & Public Affairs.1 In that article, she argued that, even
accepting the notion that a fetus is a live human with a right to live,
the burden on pregnant women may be too great to require that they
continue to keep a fetus alive. 2 To make this argument, she
analogized the position of the pregnant woman to a woman who
finds she has been medically connected to another person who is in
need of a kidney transplant.3 She then explored the ethical and
moral implications of such a situation: Could the state require the
woman to carry the physical burdens and limitations of the medical
needs of this third person? Can a woman be responsible, on penalty
of criminal sanction, for the health and wellbeing of another person?
The analogy is a compelling one and has reappeared many times
over the years between Thomson’s article and the present day.4
While the argument was not specifically referenced in Roe v. Wade,5
broad descriptions of the risks and ongoing burdens of carrying a
baby to term, delivering the child, and caring for the child afterwards
were the primary bases of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion
*Associate Professor, Justice Studies at Montclair State University in New
Jersey. Received J.D. from New York University School of Law, and Ph.D. from
New York University’s Institute for Law and Society.
1

Judith Jarvis Thomson, In Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).

2

Thomson, supra note 1, at 61–62, 66.

3

Thomson, supra note 1, at 61–62, 66.

4

E.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 129–35 (1990); Joseph
Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, at 798–99 (2012); Glenn
Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135,
1156 (2008); Nancy Hirschmann, Abortion, Self-Defense, and Involuntary Servitude,
13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 45–46 (2003); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade,
77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1574–5 (1979).
5

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) (establishing a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion).
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establishing a woman’s constitutional right to have an abortion.6
These concerns were echoed by Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion.7 From this, it is evident that although the Court did not
directly adopt Thomson’s argument that a competition of rights and
interests would exist regardless of whether the fetus should have
the rights of a child, this balancing of rights and interests was
nonetheless highly influential within the Court’s opinion.8
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana telegraphed
a number of Justices’ readiness to overturn precedent.9 Indeed,
several opinions in Ramos even hinted at guidance as to how decisions to overturn precedent may be made.10 This willingness poses
a special threat in the case of abortion jurisprudence, as discussion
of overturning Roe v. Wade—and a few Justices’ clear desire to do
6

The Court in Roe noted not only that early abortions were safer for women
than carrying a child to term, 410 U.S. at 149, but also that,
[t]he detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child-care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be
involved.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
7

Roe, 410 U.S. at 170 (“the interests of a woman in giving of her physical and
emotional self during pregnancy and the interests that will be affected throughout
her life by the birth and raising of a child”).
8

The Court found in Roe that the Constitution’s use of the word “person” in
the Fourteenth Amendment did “not include the unborn.” 410 U.S. at 158. But the
Court’s decision did not rest on this conclusion. 410 U.S. at 159 (“We need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”). To the contrary, the Court stated
that,
[t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later,
a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human
uterus . . . As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to
decide that, at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of
potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer
sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (internal citations omitted).
9

140 S. Ct. 1390, 1396–97 (2020) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment requires a
unanimous jury verdict in felony criminal cases).
10

For analyses, see Marcia Coyle, Justices Sharply Fracture Over When to
Overturn Precedent, NAT’L. L. J. (Apr. 20, 2020, 03:17 PM), https://www.law.com/nat
ionallawjournal/2020/04/20/justices-sharply-fracture-over-when-to-overturn-preced
ent; Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: With Debate over Adherence to Precedent,
Justices Scrap Nonunanimous Jury Rule, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 20, 2020, 2:28 PM), http
s://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/opinion-analysis-with-debate-over-adherence-to-pr
ecedent-justices-scrap-nonunanimous-jury-rule/.
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so—exited well before Ramos v. Louisiana.11 Despite Roe, states
like Georgia and Ohio enacted legislation banning abortion under
certain circumstances, such as when a heartbeat can be detected
(often as early as the sixth week of pregnancy).12 Other states went
even further; Alabama, for example, banned all abortions except if
“physician . . . determines that an abortion is necessary in order to
prevent a serious health risk to the unborn child’s mother.”13 These
statutes follow a movement to offer legal recognition to fetuses as
“persons,” which has influenced legislation potentially criminalizing a
litany of behavior that might endanger a fetus (such as falling down
stairs or refusing bed rest).14
The intent of these measures is clear. In Alabama, State
Representative Terri Collins (R), who sponsored the abortion ban,
stated, “This is the way we get where we want to get eventually.”15
Clarifying where the sponsors of the legislation “want to get,”
Alabama Governor Kay Ivey added this statement when she signed
the bill into law: “The sponsors of this bill believe that it is time, once
again, for the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit this important matter,
and they believe this act may bring about the best opportunity for
this to occur.”16 Similarly, in North Dakota, one sponsor of “personhood” legislation stated, “[w]e are intending that it be a direct challenge to Roe v. Wade, since [the late Justice Antonin] Scalia said
that the Supreme Court is waiting for states to raise a case.”17
To these activists, the question of whether or not the fetus is a
person settles the question of whether and under what circumstances
a woman may be allowed to have an abortion. If the fetus is a
person, aborting the fetus is killing a person. Such a thing can only
be allowed when there is a clear and immediate threat to a woman’s
11

Robert Koleman, Justice Kavanaugh Suggests He Might Be Willing to Overturn Roe v. Wade, FEDERALIST (May 6, 2020), https://thefederalist.com/2020/05/06/jus
tice-kavanaugh-suggests-he-might-be-willing-to-overturn-roe-v-wade/.
12

E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.192
(2019).
13

ALA. CODE § 26-23H-4 (2019).

14

See Michele Goodwin, If Embryos and Fetuses Have Rights, 11 LAW & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 189, 197 (2017).
15

Marisa Iati & Deanna Paul, Everything You Need to Know about the Abortion
Ban News, WASH. POST (May 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/
2019/05/17/havent-been-following-abortion-ban-news-heres-everything-you-need-k
now/.
16

Office of Ala. Governor, Governor Ivey Issues Statement After Signing the
Alabama Human Life Protection Act, GOVERNOR.ALABAMA.GOV (May 15, 2019), https://g
overnor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2019/05/governor-ivey-issues-statement-after-signi
ng-the-alabama-human-life-protection-act/.
17

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 197.
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life (as is represented in the Alabama legislation previously
discussed).18
In this context, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument reemerges. To
limit the relevant burdens of motherhood to the threat of death, and
more specifically the immediate threat of death, negates the broader
interests outlined in Roe. 19 It also ignores the weight of legal
precedent that protects bodily autonomy (at least in the case of
men), and the repeated arguments that placing such a level of physical burden on someone in order to save another’s life (for instance
in the case of a necessary organ transplant) would never be
supported.20
What is this burden? Strangely, law review articles seem to largely
gloss over its extent. Over the past decades, pregnancy and labor
have become increasingly dangerous, with the rate of maternal
mortality more than doubling in the last thirty years.21 The U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) recorded a
maternal mortality ratio of 7.2 in 1987, but that ratio had risen to
16.9 in 2016.22 Although these rates are small overall (approximately
700 deaths per year),23 the steady increase is concerning, especially
because pregnancy remains one of the top ten causes of death for
women ages twenty through forty-four.24 Of these, 60% are preventable,25 suggesting that identifying the risk of death early in the
pregnancy would not lead to a determination that an abortion was
absolutely necessary in order to save the mother’s life. Further support of this assumption is found in the fact that one-third of
pregnancy-related deaths occur between a week and a year after
18

ALA. CODE § 26-23H-4 (2019).

19

See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.

20

See sources cited supra note 4.

21

E.g., CDC, Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, CDC.GOV, https://www.cd
c.gov/reproductivehealth/maternal-mortality/pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-syste
m.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2020); Rachel Mayer, Alison Dingwall, Juli SimonThomas, Abdul Sheikhnureldin, & Kathy Lewis, The United States Maternal Mortality
Rate Will Continue To Increase Without Access To Data, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb.
4, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190130.92512/full/.
22

The ratio is a function of comparing number of maternal deaths per 100,000
live births in the year. CDC, supra note 21.
23

CDC, supra note 21.

24

CDC, LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH — FEMALES — ALL RACES AND ORIGINS — UNITED
STATES, 2017, CDC.GOV https://www.cdc.gov/women/lcod/2017/all-races-origins/inde
x.htm (last updated Nov. 20, 2019).
25

CDC, Pregnancy-Related Deaths: Saving Women’s Lives before, During and
After Delivery, CDC VITAL SIGNS (May 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/maternaldeaths/index.html.
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delivery, most often due to weakened heart muscle.26 In other words,
although a woman may show no signs of taking on a life-threatening
condition early in her pregnancy, pregnancy poses a threat that it
will weaken a woman’s body to a point that kills her even a year
after giving birth. Other risks may be similarly unpredictable—such
as the risk of infection (which caused 12% of maternal fatalities in
the United States between 2011 and 2015), hemorrhaging, or
anesthesia complications.27 Pregnant women also are more likely to
die from common illnesses like the flu.28
But fatality is far from the only risk to pregnant women. Popular
culture is full of references to the difficulties of childbirth, but shockingly light on actual acknowledgment of the lasting physical damage
that can occur as a result. Although slightly more than 1% of births
will involve severe maternal adverse health effects, ranging from the
necessary use of ventilators, blood transfusions, and temporary
tracheostomies, to heart attacks and aneurisms,29 adds up to 50,000
women per year needing interventions for such complications.30 Far
more common are lesser, but still extreme physical harms. Labor
can break bones, and it results in skin and muscle tears in at least
half of births.31 Recovering from this damage can take more than a
year.32
These risks are substantial, even without the immediate threat of
death that would be necessary for a traditional claim of self-defense33
or to qualify for an abortion under Alabama’s highly restrictive abor26

CDC, supra note 25.

27

Emily E. Petersen et al., Vital Signs: Pregnancy-Related Deaths, United
States, 2011–2015, and Strategies for Prevention, 13 States, 2013–2017, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 423 (May 10, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volume
s/68/wr/mm6818e1.htm.
28

CDC, Pregnant Women & Influenza (Flu), CDC.GOV, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/hi
ghrisk/pregnant.htm (last updated Dec. 20, 2019).
29

CDC, Reproductive Health: How Does CDC Identify Severe Maternal Morbidity?, CDC.GOV, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/smm/sev
ere-morbidity-ICD.htm (last updated Dec. 26, 2019).
30

CDC, Reproductive Health: Severe Maternal Morbidity in the United States,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/severematern
almorbidity.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2020).

CDC.GOV,
31

Kiera Butler, The Scary Truth About Childbirth, MOTHER JONES (2017), https://w
ww.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/childbirth-injuries-prolapse-cesarean-section-n
atural-childbirth/.
32

Butler, supra note 31.

33

Hirschmann, supra note 4, at 47; see also Eugene Volokh, Medical
Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment For Organs, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007) (describing the abortion argument as a question of selfdefense, but referring to abortion of a clearly viable fetus where a woman’s life is
under imminent threat).
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tion statute.34 Returning to Thompson’s argument here—under what
logic can we say a woman must undertake the possibility of these
damages? Even if we were to call a fetus a person, by what logic
can we say that the woman must act as a good Samaritan, taking
on the possibility of severe physical repercussions (let alone mental
and financial) for the sake of this other person?
One suggested answer is that a woman who is a mother carries a
special duty to her child and, therefore, has a duty to protect her
child even to her own detriment under a duty to rescue standard.35
But as Michele Goodwin argues in If Embryos and Fetuses Have
Rights,36 even this analogy fails; it also stands in conflict with a
century of precedent. Her argument is reviewed below.
II. MICHELE GOODWIN, IF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES HAVE RIGHTS, 11 LAW &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 189 (2017).
In If Embryos and Fetuses Have Rights, Michele Goodwin
explores the history and legitimacy of fetal personhood laws, asking
how, legally, we can say that an embryo’s or fetus’ safety is of higher
priority than a woman’s own bodily autonomy. She states, provocatively,
Embryos and fetuses are parasitic to a woman’s body: they are foreign
and . . . are not vital to her (or anyone else’s) survival. Thus, if . . .
gestating a fetus may kill her, what justifies punishing a woman for
excising a fetus from her body? Likewise, on what basis can law
legitimately obligate a woman to host an embryo or fetus when doing
so could mean her death?37

Goodwin begins by summarizing the history of the fetal personhood movement.38 She highlights that proponents of personhood
laws have assumed, or asserted through implication, that the rights
of fetuses must supersede the rights of pregnant women.39 She then
describes the threats that such statutes have posed to pregnant
women through criminal law, including the potential to criminally
punish women for “falling down steps, or even for refusing bed rest,”
or to charge women who miscarry with statutes as severe as first
degree murder.40
34

ALA. CODE § 26-23H-4 (2019).

35

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 192.

36

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 192.

37

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 190.

38

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 193–96.

39

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 194.

40

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 196.
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Goodwin explains that fetal personhood statutes are not only
extreme, but also run contrary to longstanding precedent.41 She
states “more than a century ago, courts refused to prosecute women
for in utero based harms. For one thing, courts considered proximate
causation to remote and indirect. Furthermore, the legal presumption of life was rooted at birth not conception.”42 In supporting this
argument, Goodwin quotes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes II, who
stated in the 1884 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision
in Dietrich v. Northampton that a fetus was not a child, and that
neither law nor common sense supported the idea that a fetus could
“stand[] on the same footing as . . . an existing person.”43 She also
relies on key pieces of English Common Law precedent, including
Regina v. Knights44 and Rex v. Izod.45 But in Section II, Goodwin
goes into this legal background in depth.
Goodwin’s Section IIA recounts in some detail the historical legal
acceptance that a fetus could not be a legal child (with the rights of
a person) until after “complete birth and physical independence.”46
She outlines this doctrine in tort and criminal law, in cases as early
as 190147 and as late as 1969.48 Although some exceptions existed,
none of these exceptions provided rights for the fetus against the
interests of the mother. Instead, these were limited to statutes allowing prosecution for the death of a fetus if the pregnant woman also
died, such as statutes allowing litigation on behalf of a fetus that
died as a result of an automobile accident; fetuses injured due to
“medical negligence in the performance of tubal ligations and
vasectomies;” and suits against genetic counselors who “fail to catch
genetic abnormalities.”49 In other words, these suits appear to have
been allowed in order to “compensate parents for their injuries rather
41

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 197.

42

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 198.

43

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 197 (quoting Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16, 1884 WL 4976 (1884)).
44

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 198 (citing Regina v. Knights, 2 F. & F. 46, 175
Eng. Rep. 952 (Bury St. Edmund’s Spr. Assizes 1860) (Cockburn, C.J.)).
45

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 198 (quoting Rex v. Izod, 20 Cox’s Crim. L.
Cases 690 (Oxford Cir. 1904) (holding that “a woman’s manslaughter conviction in
the death of her child required a showing of criminal ‘neglect after the child has
been completely born.’ ’’).
46

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 201.

47

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 201 n.66 (citing Rex v. Pritchard, 17 T.L.R. 310
(Shrewsbury Spr. Assizes 1901).
48

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 202 n.70 (citing Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969)).
49

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 202.
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than remedying harm to the unborn.”50 Such cases present a very
different theory of fetal personhood than modern cases, that provide
suits on behalf of injuries to the fetus, against the interests of the
mother.51
In Section IIB of her article, Goodwin explores these tort cases
further, explaining the courts’ understanding that, generally, tort
litigation on behalf of a fetus could not be successful because no
proximate cause exists.52 When a fetus has not been born, causation of death is necessarily questionable. 53 This issue further
contributes to courts’ unwillingness to extend tort litigation for fetal
injuries (rather than in the interests of the parents), and even in
cases of parents’ loss courts questioned the propriety of allowing
recovery through tort.54 Such cases were allowed only when litigants
could prove the fetus was viable, and even then, courts “expressed
concerns” due to “the potential for fraud, fictitious claims, [and] false
testimony.”55
In all, then, Goodwin’s history shows that suits against persons
other than parents were strictly limited because of the lack of
confidence that the fetus would ever become a live person even
without whatever unfortunate event had harmed it. Suits against
parents for harms to their unborn offspring were barely contemplated
and quickly dismissed when they occurred.
In Part III of her article, Goodwin turns to the “no duty to rescue”
rule. 56 Noting that the rule is morally uncomfortable and often
criticized, she still highlights the point that it is a broadly accepted
and universally established rule.57 To apply the rule against women,
to say that women are obligated to support their children, even to
their own detriment, when men are not, would be applying differing
legal standards based on sex.58 It is therefore untenable.59
In Section IIIA of her article, Goodwin addresses the instinctive,
50

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 203.

51

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 203.

52

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 203–06.

53

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 205.

54

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 205–06.

55

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 205–06.

56

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 207.

57

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 208 (italics added) (“Simply put, generally, law
does not impose a duty to rescue”); Goodwin, supra note 14, at 209 (“[I]t is evident
that to attempt to punish men by law for not rendering to others . . . would be
preposterous.”) (quoting THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULEY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE
INDIAN LAW COMMISSION 55–56 (1837)).
58

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 209.

59

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 209.
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emotional, natural response, that protecting children is different. She
devotes the entire section to showing the huge number of foundational “no duty to rescue” cases that involve babies and toddlers.60
She concludes by recalling classic negligence and fault principles
that “penal law must content itself with keeping men from doing
positive harm . . . [as opposed to] furnishing men with motives for
doing positive good.”61 The two exceptions to this rule are if the
individual has created the peril or if some special relationship exists
with the person to be rescued.62 Of course, the immediate response
is that there is a special relationship between parent and child, and
so this is the issue Goodwin takes up in Section IIIB of her article.
In exploring the extent of the duty to rescue in special relationships, Goodwin begins by discussing McFall v. Shimp.63 The court in
this case explored whether a duty to rescue existed between two
(very close) cousins, one of whom was in immediate need of a bone
marrow transplant, and the other was the only suitable donor.64 In
this case, the court found that
[u]ltimately, Robert McFall did not possess a legal right to invade his
cousin’s body, even if to save his own life . . . even in the case of an
intimate relationship where the individuals share a genetic bond and
intimacy, a court cannot compel th[is] type of altruism . . . one’s body
cannot be invaded for the purpose of saving another’s life.65

Goodwin then recounts several similar decisions between siblings,
rather than cousins.66 She notes that even in cases in which the
burden to the donor is minimal and the need of the relative is life or
death, courts repeatedly state that no one can be forced to undergo
medical procedures.67 She notes that “Bone marrow transplants are
surgeries with minimal risks for the donors; they involve a needle
inserted in the hip and extraction of the marrow. During the process,
the donor is under anesthesia and subsequent pain can be treated
through postoperative medication.”68 Yet even in these cases, “the
courts collectively emphasize the importance of bodily integrity,
60

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 209–11.

61

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 212 (quoting BABINGTON MACAULAY, supra note 58,

at 56).
62

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 2012.

63

Goodwin, supra note 14, 212–13 (citing McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d
90, 1978 WL 255 (C.P. 1978)).
64

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 212–13.

65

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 213.

66

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 214.

67

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 215 (citing, inter alia, Curran v. Bosze, 141 Ill. 2d
473, 153 Ill. Dec. 213, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 4 A.L.R.5th 1163 (1990)).
68

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 215.
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autonomy, informed consent, and best interest of individuals from
whom bodily resources are demanded.”69
In Section IIIC, Goodwin makes the direct connection to pregnancy
and the duty to rescue a fetus (by continuing a pregnancy).70 She
returns to the risks that such a policy would pose, in terms of criminal
prosecution and tort litigation. She quotes the Supreme Court of
Canada to make the point that, since every aspect of a pregnant
woman’s life may affect a fetus, opening the door to criminal or tort
liability for prenatal negligence “could render the most mundane
decision taken in the course of her daily life as a pregnant woman
subject to the scrutiny of the courts.”71
Like so many, even after exploring the idea of comparative risks
and benefits from the no duty to rescue cases, Goodwin largely
leaves unspoken the extent of risks or burdens to pregnant women,
instead referring to a general slippery slope argument. Although she
later explores the implications of forced cesarean section (and having quoted the aforementioned court description of bone marrow
transplants’ minimal invasiveness), she does not discuss how much
larger and more invasive a surgery this would be compared to a
bone marrow transplant.72 Instead, she focuses on the possible end
results of a line of reasoning that allows requiring surgery—limitations on flying, liability for failure to take prenatal vitamins.73 It is, in
some ways, fascinating that her argument acknowledges the role of
stereotypes and long status as property “render[ing] any ideas about
their self-autonomy, privacy, and equality meaningless,”74 but still
fails to highlight the burdens and risks of pregnancy itself.
Goodwin returns to the distastefulness of the no duty to rescue
doctrine in Section IIID of her article.75 Although she acknowledges
the problems attendant to it, she also highlights the policy interests
that have supported the doctrine’s establishment, including the risk
of vague and confusing duties, and the risk to actors, compelled to
act, who may harm themselves in doing so.76 Here, again, the risk to
pregnant women’s lives goes unspoken.
III. CONCLUSION
Goodwin’s argument is a classically legal argument. She presents
69

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 216.

70

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 216–22.

71

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 218 (quoting Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v.
Dobson, 1999 WL 33190099 (Can. 1999) (Can.)).
72

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 219–20.

73

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 221.

74

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 219.

75

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 221.

76

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 222–23.
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the doctrines that clearly contradict the modern move towards fetal
personhood, and refers back to the inequality and irrationality of
making exceptions in those doctrines for women only. This is a
compelling argument against imposing criminal liability for negligent,
reckless, and even intentional actions by women that harm their
unborn fetuses.
More importantly in the current climate, however, Goodwin’s argument applies regardless of whether we consider fetuses to be people
vested with legally cognizable rights. Even if fetuses have rights, the
rights of pregnant women still exist. As Goodwin shows, established
U.S. doctrine suggests that people have a right to choose not to
take on extended physical risk and invasion for the sake of saving
someone else’s life—even if that life belongs to a fetus.
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